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ABSTRACT
The evolution of the aggregate labor market is far from smooth. I investigate the success of a macro
model in replicating the observed levels of volatility of unemployment and other key variables. I take
variations in productivity growth and in exogenous product demand (government purchases plus net
exports) as the primary exogenous sources of fluctuations. The macro model embodies new ideas
about the labor market, all based on equilibrium – the models I consider do not rest on inefficiency
in the use of labor caused by an inappropriate wage. I find that non-standard features of the labor
market are essential for understanding the volatility of unemployment. These models include simple
equilibrium wage stickiness, where the sticky wage is an equilibrium selection rule. A second model
based  on  modern  bargaining  theory  delivers  a  different  kind  of  stickiness  and  has  a  unique
equilibrium. A third model posits fluctuations in matching efficiency that may arise from variations
over time in the information about prospective jobs among job-seekers. Reasonable calibrations of







Observed movements of employment and unemployment are larger than standard general-
equilibrium models can comprehend, given the relatively small exogenous shocks that hit
the economy. I investigate this topic in a family of models with labor markets that contain
ampliﬁcation mechanisms that may contribute to the understanding of volatility.
The models incorporate some standard features of modern general-equilibrium macroe-
conomics. Households plan consumption according to a standard Euler equation. Invest-
ment faces adjustment cost. With respect to the labor market, I depart from the main
tradition of real business cycle and dynamic general equilibrium macro models. That tradi-
tion has considered the margin between employment in the market and time spent at home
and has neglected time spent looking for work. I follow the other important tradition of
modern macroeconomics, the matching model of job search. This line of thought considers
the margin between working and looking for work and takes labor-force participation to be
inelastic. In place of the Nash-bargain wage determination usually considered in that tra-
dition, I consider two alternatives. First is the equilibrium sticky-wage formulation in Hall
(2005c). The wage is less responsive to current conditions, though not so sticky as to cre-
ate bilaterally inefﬁcient outcomes between employer and worker. Second is the bargaining
model of Hall and Milgrom (2005), which replaces non-credible threats to abandon wage
bargaining with credible threats to extend bargaining. That model achieves a sticky-wage
result by limiting the role of conditions in the labor market in wage determination. I also
consider a model where ﬂuctuations in matching efﬁciency drive unemployment ﬂuctua-
tions. Thelastmodelmimicsﬂuctuationsarisingfromchangesinthequalityofinformation
available to job-seekers that induce alterations in self-selection, following Hall (2005a).
The economy in this paper is explicitly non-stationary. I present essentially exact nu-
merical solutions to a stochastic growth model whose levels of output, consumption, and
capital have unit roots, inherited from the unit root in the efﬁciency of production. Rather
than deal with ﬁltered data to remove the unit root, I state the key variables as ratios to the
2capital stock. The model is stationary in these ratios.
I measure volatility in terms of changes in the variables. This approach captures the
cyclical component of volatility along with the important movements that are not necessar-
ily associated with any concept of a business cycle. The model and associated measurement
approach do not rest on any attempt to separate cyclical movements from other movements.
This paper is a further development of the efforts of Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996),
and Alexopoulos (2004) to incorporate unemployment in general-equilibrium macro mod-
eling. The most important difference from earlier work is in wage determination and
the ampliﬁcation of ﬂuctuations that occurs with equilibrium sticky wages and other non-
standard features of the labor market.
I ﬁnd that departing from the standard view of the labor market is essential for under-
standing the volatility of unemployment. As Shimer (2005) has demonstrated, the standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) setup cannot rationalize movements of unemployment of
the observed magnitude as the result of productivity shocks of the observed magnitude.
Non-standard labor-market models provide the needed ampliﬁcation mechanisms. A basic
idea common to all of the models—discussed in Hall (2005c)—is that employers deter-
mine the level of recruiting effort based on the expected share of the joint value created
when they form matches with workers. In times when the share is low, recruiting effort
is correspondingly low. Job-ﬁnding rates for the unemployed are low and the unemploy-
ment rate is high. Matches are formed and retained efﬁciently, according to the principle
of maximizing joint value. Bilateral efﬁciency implies that the model’s view of the labor
market is one of economic equilibrium, not the disequilibrium previously associated with
ampliﬁcation mechanisms based on sticky wages.
The model overcomes one of the most persuasive criticisms of real business-cycle
models—that the models portray recessions as the result of actual contractions in produc-
tivity (see Summers (1986)). Here, in a growing economy, a recession with abnormal un-
employment will occur when productivity growth is positive but lower than normal. I also
3show that movements in exogenous product demand are important sources of ﬂuctuations.
This driving force has received less attention from earlier models.
At reasonable values of the key parameters—intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
capital adjustment cost, and wage stickiness—the models account reasonably well for the




Serially independent shocks at affect productivity At, which evolves as
At+1 = atAt: (1)
The shocks are drawn from a discrete set, fa1;:::;a5g with probabilities fÃ1;:::;Ã5g. Se-
rially correlated shocks gt affect exogenous product demand. They are stated as ratios to
consumption, ct, so the shocks to product demand are gtct. They are drawn from a discrete
set fg1;g2;g3g and obey a ﬁrst-order Markoff process:
Prob [gt+1 = g
0jgt = g] = ¼g;g0 (2)
2.2 Technology, capital, and consumption
Let yt be output produced at time t, At be the efﬁciency of production, nt be employment,
kt be capital, xt = kt+1=kt be the capital growth ratio (also the investment/capital ratio),
vt be resources expended in recruiting workers, and ct be consumption. ¿ is a parameter











4The government purchases part of output and another part leaves the country as net exports.
I take the sum of the two to be an exogenous fraction, gt, of consumption. Because the
model is nonstationary, the exogenous component of product demand needs to be linked to
a variable that grows according to the economy’s stochastic trend; consumption is the most
suitable choice because it is the most stable.
Capital deteriorates at rate ±, so it follows the law of motion








2 ¡ vt ¡ (1 + gt)ct: (5)






kt (xt ¡ 1)
2 ¡ xtkt: (6)




(qt ¡ 1) + 1; (7)
Tobin’s investment equation. The Tobin coefﬁcient, ¿, controls capital adjustment. If ¿ =
0, capital does not adjust at all; the economy is the endowment economy of Lucas (1978).
If ¿ = 1, capital adjusts without impediment and q is always one.
Households can buy and sell a claim to a unit of installed capital with price qt. Its return
ratio is
Rt+1 =















The marginal rate of substitution prices all economic values in period t + 1. I deﬁne the
present value operator,
Pt(Xt+1) = Et (mt+1Xt+1): (10)
5Households plan consumption to satisfy the Euler equation,
Pt (Rt+1) = 1: (11)
This setup makes the implicit assumption that individuals are fully insured for the idiosyn-
cratic risk of unemployment—all individuals consume the same amount, independent of
their employment situations. See Merz (1995) for further discussion of this point.
2.3 Labor market
The labor market operates according to principles laid out in Hall (2005c), Hall (2005b),
and, inalatersection, HallandMilgrom(2005), basedonsomeofthefeaturesofMortensen
and Pissarides (1994).
I normalize the labor force at one. The number of workers who lose their jobs each
quarter is a constant, s. Among the job-losers, a fraction f ﬁnd new jobs immediately. The
remainder ﬁnd jobs after a quarter. Thus the unemployment rate is ut = s(1 ¡ ft). The






beneﬁt that the unemployment rate is not a state variable. The emphasis on the probability
that a job-loser becomes unemployed is realistic—much of the variation in U.S. unemploy-
ment arises from ﬂuctuations in the fraction of job-losers who become unemployed—see
Hall (2005d).
Job-seekers receive unemployment beneﬁts at a ﬂow rate ¸t, ﬁnanced by a lump-sum
tax.
Workers receive compensation with present value Wt from jobs starting in quarter t.
The Bellman value, Ut, associated with being unemployed is the sum of expected unem-
ployment beneﬁts, the wage, Wt+1, paid by the job to be found next quarter, and the value,
6Vt+1, of being employed at that time, apart from the wages on that job:
Ut = ¸t + Pt(Wt+1 + Vt+1): (13)
The worker may (1) separate next quarter and ﬁnd another job immediately, (2) separate
next quarter and enter unemployment, or (3) remain at work. Vt is the present value, while
employed, of these three possible states next quarter:
Vt = Pt (st+1ft+1(Wt+1 + Vt+1) + st+1(1 ¡ ft+1)Ut+1 + (1 ¡ st+1)Vt+1): (14)
I let Zt be the present value of the marginal product of the worker on a particular job,
at the time the job begins. It satisﬁes the recursion,
Zt = °At(1 ¡ ut)
°¡1k
1¡°
t + Pt ((1 ¡ st+1)Zt+1): (15)
Employers devote an amount of output, vt, to recruiting and qualifying workers—vt
includes all expenditures on workers that occur before the terms of a match are set through
a wage bargain. Employers’ recruiting spending determines the job-ﬁnding rate, ft. When
employers are looking actively for new workers, jobs are easy to ﬁnd and ft is high. The
marginal beneﬁt of added recruitment spending in terms of the job-ﬁnding rate declines
with vt according to a concave function Á(vt=kt). I scale by capital because recruiting and
qualifying workers is more expensive in a more advanced economy.
My treatment of the matching process departs from the standard in the matching lit-
erature for reasons of modeling convenience, not substance. Linking the job-ﬁnding rate
directly to recruiting expenditure can be seen as a reduced form of the usual set-up, where
vacancies appear explicitly—see Hall (2005b).
Employers earn a ﬂow of proﬁt equal to the beneﬁt from hiring one new worker (the
employer’s share of the surplus for a job, Zt¡Wt) multiplied by the ﬂow of new hires, sft,
less the cost of recruiting the ﬂow of workers, vt. Employers compete for the services of
job-seekers up to the point of zero proﬁt. The zero-proﬁt condition is
vt = (Zt ¡ Wt)sft: (16)
72.4 Stationary model
Before discussing wage determination, I create a stationary version of the model by re-
deﬁning the following variables to be their earlier values divided by the capital stock, kt:
consumption, ct, recruiting resources, vt, government purchases, gt, and the four labor-
market values, Ut, Vt, Zt, and Wt. I also introduce the state variable zt = Atk
¡°
t , the ratio
of capacity, Atk
1¡°
t , to capital, kt. In the labor market, I assume that unemployment com-














(qt ¡ 1) + 1 (19)
Rt+1 =











Pt (Rt+1) = 1 (22)
Ut = ¸°zt(1 ¡ ut)
°¡1 + Pt(Wt+1 + Vt+1)xt (23)
Vt = Pt (st+1ft+1(Wt+1 + Vt+1) + st+1(1 ¡ ft+1)Ut+1 + (1 ¡ st+1)Vt+1)xt (24)
Zt = °zt(1 ¡ ut)
°¡1 + Pt ((1 ¡ st+1)Zt+1)xt (25)
vt = (Zt ¡ Wt)sft (26)
ft = Á(vt) (27)






I will consider the following model of wage determination:
Wt = ·W
¤ + (1 ¡ ·)
1
2
(Ut ¡ Vt + Zt): (30)
The quantity 1
2(Ut ¡ Vt + Zt) is the average of the reservation wage of the jobseeker,
Ut ¡ Vt, and the reservation wage of the employer, Zt. It is the wage set in a symmetric
Nash bargain, as in the earlier literature. To the extent that · > 0, the wage is sticky
compared to the Nash-bargain wage, as in Hall (2005c). It does not respond as much to the
immediate ups and downs of productivity. If · = 0, the Nash bargain sets the wage. This
wage rises when a favorable productivity shock, at, hits the economy. Output rises more
than the capital stock—this is true without capital adjustment costs, but is even more true in
their presence. The scarcity raises the marginal product of labor, which is proportional to
the state variable zt—see equation (25). The actual wage Wt responds immediately through
the Nash bargain. As capital rises to restore the normal output/capital ratio, zt returns to its
normal value and the wage is back to normal in relation to the capital stock.
I set the parameter W ¤ to the level of the wage/capital ratio in the stationary non-
stochastic Nash-bargain model—the normal wage in the ﬂexible-wage model. In the ﬁxed-
wage model (· = 1), the wage/capital ratio, Wt, is constant at the level W ¤. That is, the
wage remains at its normal level in relation to the capital stock rather than rising when
productivity growth is strong and falling when it is weak.
Intermediate values of · describe an economy with partial wage stickiness.
Equation (30) may place the wage outside the bargaining set—that is, below the job-
seeker’s reservation wage Ut ¡ Vt or above the employer’s reservation wage, Zt. I mod-
ify the equation to keep the wage within the bargaining set. Thus the sticky wage lies
within the equilibrium set described in Hall (2005c). Sticky wages never cause inefﬁcient
separations—they cause unemployment volatility through their inﬂuence on employers’
recruiting efforts.
92.6 Other issues
I assume that the productivity and exogenous spending shocks each take on one of a ﬁnite
number of possible values. In this setting, the expectations in the Euler equations are
summations rather than integrals.
To solve the model, I represent each endogenous variable as a function of the state vari-
ables, z and g, with a ﬁnite set of parameters (speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcients of a Tchebysheff
polynomial of order 9). I write the model in terms of the current value of z and its value one
year in the future, z0 = ax¡°z. The resulting model is a large system of nonlinear equa-
tions in the coefﬁcients of the functions, which can be solved by standard methods. Based
on the solution, I represent the entire model as a ﬁrst-order Markoff process of very high
dimension. I calculate the stationary distribution from the Markoff matrix and derive the
(essentially) exact standard deviations of the endogenous variables from that distribution.
For further details, see Judd (1998) and the appendix to this paper.
Notice that the model embodies a transversality condition that the variables tend toward
a stationary point. In other words, a solution corresponds to a terminal condition in the
distant future, not a condition that has an appreciable effect on the economy today. The
transversality condition takes the form of the requirement that the consumption rule cg(z)
depends only on z and g. If the economy faced a terminal condition in ﬁnite time, the
consumption rule would depend on that condition as well.
3 Volatility Measures
Table 1 shows data for the years 1949 through 2000 for the volatility measures that I con-
sider. The ﬁrst is productivity growth, taken as an exogenous driving force of ﬂuctuations.
The standard deviation of quarterly growth in total factor productivity is 0.94 percent. The
second is the ratio of exogenous spending to consumption, another driving force. Its stan-
dard deviation is 4.8 percent.
10Variable Data source Units Value
Productivity growth Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multi-








Government purchases plus 
net exports relative to 
consumption
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
National Income and Product 
Accounts, Table 1.1.5. Nominal 
Gross Domestic Product
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
4.83
Consumption growth Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
National Income and Product 
Accounts,Table 1.1.3. Real Gross 
Domestic Product, Quantity Indexes
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
0.88
Investment/capital ratio Growth ratio of the real capital stock 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Fixed Asset Tables, Table 1.2. Chain-
Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock 
of Fixed Assets and Consumer 
Durable Goods
Standard deviation 
of annual data, 
divided by 4, 
percent
0.22
Log of capacity/capital ratio Ratio of productivity index to (capital 
stock raised to the power 0.7), with 
constant exponential trend removed
Standard deviation 
of log of annual 
data, multiplied by 
100
4.43
Unemployment Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Unemployment rate, 16 years and 
older
Standard deviation 
of quarterly data, 
percent
1.57
Table 1. Data on macro volatility in the U.S., 1949-2000
11The remaining measures are for variables taken to be endogenous in the model. Con-
sumption growth has a quarterly standard deviation of 0.88 percent. The standard deviation
of the investment/capital ratio (the growth rate of the capital stock) is 0.22 percent. I take
unemployment to be stationary, so I measure its volatility as the standard deviation of its
level, 1.57 percent.
4 Functional Forms and Parameter Values
In my discussion of the volatility implied by the model, I will start from a base case for
the key parameters: I take the wage stickiness coefﬁcient · to be 0.43, implying a wage
that responds only partially to the current state of the economy. I take the base value of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution ¾ to be 0.4, somewhat above the value suggested in
Hall (1988), in deference to suggestions in the recent literature of downward bias in my
estimates. The implied value of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is 2.5, a reasonable
value in terms of the discussion in Lucas (1994). Finally, I take the base value of the Tobin
coefﬁcient for capital adjustment ¿ to be 0.25—see Hall (2004).
I consider the following alternative values of the key parameters: Flexible wages, with
· = 0, less intertemporal substitution, with ¾ = 0:2 (with higher coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion, 5), and faster capital adjustment, with ¿ = 0:5.
The driving forces for ﬂuctuations in the model are technology growth, at, and ex-
ogenous spending relative to consumption, gt. In both cases, I convert time-series data to
discrete values by placing them in bins. I deﬁne the bins so that an equal fraction of the
observations fall in each bin. In the case of technology growth, I take the deviation from
the mean to be half the annual growth rate, to match the standard deviation of the observed
annual data. The average values for quarterly productivity growth in the ﬁve bins are -0.90,
-0.11, 0.26, 0.79, and 1.56 percent.
For exogenous product demand (the ratio of government purchases and net exports to
consumption), I work directly with quarterly data. Table 2 describes the distribution. The
12Value 24.5 31.3 36.7
24.5 93.5 6.5 0.0
31.3 7.8 85.7 6.5
36.7 0.0 6.5 93.5
Transition probabilities from column value 
to row value
Table 2. Transition frequencies for exogenous spending as a percent of consump-
tion
average value of gt in each bin are shown in the columns labeled “Value.” The table shows
the transition frequencies among the three categories.
I take the rate of deterioration of capital and the labor elasticity of the production func-
tion to have the standard values ± = 0:025, and ° = 0:7. I pick the utility discount so that
the average return to capital is 5 percent per year: ¯ = 0:9992.
I take the recruiting technology to have the form
f = Á(v=k) = ! (v=k)
1=2 : (31)
I pick the efﬁciency parameter of the recruiting technology, !, by setting up a version of
the model with constant, non-stochastic productivity growth at the average rate from the
values in Table 2. I prescribe that the unemployment rate be its post-1949 average of 5.5
percent. I take the exogenous separation rate s to have the value 10 percent per quarter per
month (see Hall (2005d) for a discussion of the measurement of the separation rate). Then
I solve the model comprising equations (18) through (30) plus an additional equation that
gives the condition for a stationary z,
gx
¡° = 1 (32)
The solution provides the value ! = 8:9.
135 Properties of the Model
The state variables, zt, the capacity/capital ratio, and gt, exogenous spending, capture the
current departure of the economy from its steady state. A favorable productivity shock
increases capacity immediately and raises zt correspondingly. Investment responds imme-
diately and capital begins to rise, driving zt back to its normal level until the next shock
occurs. Productivity shocks are permanent in the model. On the other hand, exogenous
spending shocks, gt, are persistent but ultimately die out, as ratios to consumption. A
strictly permanent spending shock would depress consumption permanently by the same
amount and leave all other variables unaffected. In the case where the spending shock dies
out over time, investment falls at the time of the shock. The cumulating decline in the
capital stock causes zt to rise gradually in the period after the spending shock. Investment
rises later to restore the steady-state value of zt as spending returns to normal. Thus zt has
an exponential response to productivity impulses and a hump-shaped response to spending
impulses.
Table 3 reports the calculated volatilities for a variety of combinations of the key pa-
rameters. The base case, in the ﬁrst column of results, ﬁts the observed volatilities fairly
well. The model slightly overstates the volatilities of consumption growth and the invest-
ment ratio and matches the volatilitiesof the capacity/capital ratio and unemploymentfairly
closely. Of course, the match is the result of adjusting parameter values, so Table 3 is really
the result of applying indirect inference informally. As I will show shortly, the exogenous
spending shock is an important contributor to the model’s ability to explain volatility—in
the presence of only the technology shock, the model understates volatility.
The second column of results shows the main point of the paper. Replacing the sticky-
wage speciﬁcation with the standard Nash-bargain model of wage determination, I ﬁnd
vastly too little volatility of unemployment. This ﬁnding conﬁrms, in a general-equilibrium
setting, Shimer (2005)’s point that the standard matching model cannot generate anything












ı, intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4
Ĳ, adjustment cost parameter 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5
ț, wage stickiness parameter 0.43 0 0.43 0.43
Standard deviations
Consumption growth 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.03 0.90
Investment/capital ratio 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.23
Log of capacity/capital ratio 4.43 4.59 4.79 6.10 4.53
Unemployment 1.57 1.59 0.24 1.66 1.54
Table 3. Actual and calculated volatilities
15the other variables are reasonably well matched. One must look in the labor market itself
to see that something important is missing from a general-equilibrium model. Standard
models can account for the volatilities of consumption growth and the other non-labor
variables.
The column of Table 3 headed “Lower intertemporal substitution” considers an econ-
omy with an intertemporal elasticity, ¾, of 0.2 in place of the base value of 0.4. This
economy has higher consumption volatility because the consumption substitution effect is
smaller and offsets the wealth effect less. The volatilities of the investment/capital and ca-
pacity/capital ratios are—unrealistically—much higher because consumption absorbs less
of each shock.
The column of Table 3 headed “Lower adjustment cost” describes an economy with
a higher response of investment to Tobin’s q. The coefﬁcient, ¿, is 0.5 in this economy
against 0.25 in the base economy. A lower adjustment cost has remarkably little effect on
the volatilities implied by the model.
5.1 Endogenous variables as functions of state variables
An instructive way to display the model is in terms of functions such as ug(z) that show
how the key variables depend on the two state variables. These functions, represented as
polynomials in z, are the results of solving the model, as described in the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows ug(z) for the intermediate value of exogenous spending, g. The differ-
ence is dramatic between the response of unemployment in the sticky- and ﬂexible-wage
models. The curve at the bottom of this and later ﬁgures shows the marginal probability
distribution of the capacity/capital ratio, z. In the sticky-wage model, the wage remains
close to its normal level in relation to the capital stock even when a disappointment in pro-
ductivity growth causes the capacity/capital ratio to drop below normal. In this case, the
wage is higher than the ﬂexible wage and employers have correspondingly less incentive





























Figure 1. Unemployment responses, base case and ﬂexible wage
and unemployment is high. The reverse holds for good news in productivity, which brings
forth high recruiting effort and low unemployment.
By contrast, Figure 1 shows that unemployment is barely responsive to shifts in the
capacity/capital ratio when wages are ﬂexible. Adjustments of the wage result in only
small changes in the incentive to hire and corresponding unemployment rate. The ﬁgure
conﬁrms, in a full dynamic general-equilibrium setting, the point of Shimer (2005) that the
Mortensen-Pissarides model with Nash-bargain wage setting cannot explain the volatility
of unemployment given the known amplitude of the driving force.
Figure 1 makes it clear that the ﬂexible-wage model cannot come close to matching
the observed volatility of unemployment. From Table 1, unemployment has a standard
deviation of 1.57 percentage points. The model—with base-case parameters except for
full wage ﬂexibility (· = 0)—implies a standard deviation of unemployment of only 0.24


































Figure 2. Investment as a function of the state variables
sticky-wage case (· = 0:43).
Figure 2 shows one of the key relationships in the model, the value of investment (mea-
sured by the growth factor for capital, x) as a function of the capacity/capital ratio, z, and
the level of exogenous spending, g. Investment responds to spending because spending
shocks, though highly persistent, are not permanent. The economy responds to spending
shocks in part by deferring investment until the time when the shock begins to subside.
Figure 3 shows consumption as a function of the capacity/capital ratio z and the discrete
state of exogenous spending. Because the spending shocks are quite persistent, consump-
tion responds signiﬁcantly to the shocks.
The solution of the model includes a function Wg(z) that describes the wage as a func-
tion of the capacity/capital ratio, z, and the discrete state of exogenous spending, g. The
model requires that the wage lie within the bargaining set [U ¡ V;Z]. The model solution





























Figure 3. Consumption as a function of the state variables
the actual wage W(z) and the boundaries of the bargaining set, for the intermediate value
of exogenous spending, g = g2. The actual wage reaches the upper boundary at the low-
est values of z, but, as the distribution at the bottom of the ﬁgure shows, this outcome is
extremely rare. In bad times, employers gain hardly any of the surplus from a job match
and consequently put almost no resources into recruitment. The unemployment rate rises
to serious recession levels.
5.2 Impulse response functions
The impulse response function is a standard tool for understanding the properties of dy-
namic models. I deﬁne the impulse response function as the difference between the mean
of a variable following an impulse and the stationary mean of the variable. I character-
ize the impulse as a shift in the distribution relative to the stationary distribution. For the



































Figure 4. Reservation and actual wages as functions of z, for middle level of spend-
ing
20a special transition matrix to the stationary distribution. The special matrix alters the ex-
ogenous transition matrix ¼i;i0 by subtracting a small number from a diagonal element and
adding the same number to the element to the right. The effect is an upward shift in the dis-
crete state g. For the technology shock, the alternative distribution is the density evaluated
at z ¡ :01. The effect is to shift the capacity/capital ratio upward by 0.01.
I multiply the discretized stationary joint distribution of z and g by the special transition
matrix to ﬁnd the distribution of the two variables immediately after the impulse. I then
multiply that distribution by the standard transition matrix to ﬁnd the distribution in the
period following the impulse. I continue the process for 20 quarters. From the distribution
of z and g in each period, I calculate the distributions of the other endogenous variables
and calculate their means.
Figure 5 shows the responses of unemployment over time to a positive productivity im-
pulse, for the ﬂexible-wage and sticky-wage models. The scale is omitted from the vertical
axis, as the size of the impulse is arbitrary and the purpose of this and other similar ﬁgures
is to compare responses of different models to the same impulse. In both cases, unemploy-
ment falls immediately and gradually returns to normal (shown as a ﬁne horizontal line).
The magnitude of the effect is far greater for the sticky-wage case. With ﬂexible wages, the
incentive for job-creation, Z ¡ W, hardly improves when Z rises, because W rises almost
as much. With sticky wages, W rises as well, but not as much, so the incentive increases,
spending on recruiting rises, and the labor market tightens. In both cases, the dynamics
of z control the return to normal. The immediate effect of the technology impulse is a
jump in z—the impulse raises the numerator of z while leaving its denominator, the capital
stock, unchanged. As capital accumulates following the shock, z returns to normal and all
variables, including the unemployment rate, also return to normal.
Figure 6 shows the responses of unemployment to an increase in exogenous spending.
Again, the response is much more dramatic for the sticky-wage model. In that model, the
initial effect of the impulse is to increase unemployment, because the increase in spending

















Figure 5. Response of unemployment to a productivity shock
lowers the present value of future productivity, Z, immediately because it raises the ex-
pected future discount rate. This effect would be even stronger if labor supply were some-
what elastic. I explore these discount-rate effects below. After three quarters, a stronger
effect from rising z overcomes the initial effect and unemployment begins to fall below its
normal level. Eventually, unemployment turns around and returns to its normal level. The
process is prolonged because the spending shock is highly persistent.
5.3 The role of variations in the discount rate
One of the important contributions of general-equilibrium analysis of matching models of
the labor market is to assess the role of variations in the discount rate. Recall that the
present value of a worker’s productivity over the duration of a job, measured as of the
beginning of the job, is
Zt = °zt(1 ¡ ut)
°¡1 + Pt ((1 ¡ st+1)Zt+1)xt: (33)

















Figure 6. Response of unemployment to a spending shock
A higher discount rate lowers the second term on the right-hand side. The equilibrium
value of Z is sensitive to the future discount rate over the roughly three-year period that the
job will last.
To measure the role of variations in the discount rate, I create a version of the model
in which the discount applied to the three labor-market variables, Z, U, and V , is constant
rather than endogenous. I ﬁx the marginal rate of substitution m at its stationary value from
the calibration. In this model, unemployment is substantially more volatile—the standard
deviation of unemployment is 3.9 percent, compared to 1.6 percent in actuality and in the
base case.
Endogenous discounting reduces the volatility of unemployment. When a positive pro-
ductivity shock hits the economy, the return to capital rises immediately. Consumption
growth rises to satisfy the consumption Euler equation. Both immediate and future dis-
count rates are higher. The value of Z is correspondingly lower than it would be with a
23constant discount rate. The reward to recruiting, Z ¡ W, is also lower than it would be
with a constant rate. This factor offsets the direct stimulus from higher productivity in
raising Z, which therefore rises less than it would with a constant discount rate.
In the case of a positive shock to exogenous spending, the reason for attenuation of the
effect on unemployment through the endogenous discount rate is similar, but not quite the
same. Because the spending shock has no effect on productivity and no initial effect on the
capital stock, the effects of the discount rate arise entirely through expectations of a higher
future discount rate. The spending shock results in a decline in investment, which drives
up the return as the shortfall in capital cumulates. The effect that is immediate in the case
of a productivity shock occurs over time for a spending shock.
5.4 Contributions of the two driving forces
Table 4 compares the standard deviations of the key variables in the full model (corre-
sponding to the ﬁrst column of results in Table 3) and in structurally identical models that
have only the technology shock and only the exogenous spending shock. I ﬁnd the exact
solutions to the modiﬁed models, so that these results apply to economies where partici-
pants know about the nature of the shocks. The left column of results repeats the standard
deviations from Table 3 for the full model. The middle column shows the effects of the
technology shock alone by setting the exogenous spending shock to zero. The right-hand
column shows the effect of the spending shock alone.
The spending shock is a little more important than the productivity shock for the invest-
ment/capital ratio, while the technology shock is a little more important for consumption
growth and the capacity/capital ratio and rather more important for unemployment.
6 Credible Threats in Wage Bargaining
Hall and Milgrom (2005) point out that the standard model in the Mortensen-Pissarides
tradition imputes threat points in the wage bargaining process that are not credible. A









Consumption growth 0.88 0.94 0.73 0.60
Investment/capital ratio 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.17
Log of capacity/capital ratio 4.43 4.59 3.66 2.37
Unemployment 1.57 1.59 1.34 0.73
Table 4. Contributions of technology and spending shocks
job-seeker and an employer, having found each other, enjoy a valuable joint surplus that
would be dissipated if one of the parties walked away from bargaining. Rather than walk
away, a party can take a step to create a successful match. The sequential-offer bargaining
model of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) provides a coherent framework for
studying credible threats. At each step in bargaining, one party may accept an offer or
make a counter-offer. The choice involves balancing the possibility of improving the terms
of the bargain by making a counter-offer and the cost of the delay resulting from making
the counter-offer rather than accepting the pending offer.
In the simplest model of the wage bargain based on alternating offers and credible







¡ Vt + Zt
!
(34)
Here b is the net joint bias in the job-seeker’s favor resulting from delay—the sum of the
job-seeker’s beneﬁt from spending time bargaining rather than working and the employer’s
cost of extending the bargaining process. During bargaining delay, the job-seeker avoids
burdensome work and continues to draw unemployment beneﬁts. The employer incurs
costs of time devoted to the wage negotiations. The variable r denotes the short-term
25discount rate applicable to the bias. Notice that the capitalized value bt=rt replaces Ut in
the earlier ﬂexible-wage speciﬁcation based on the Nash bargain with non-credible threat
points. Although the wage is disconnected from current conditions in the labor market as
measured by Ut, it remains sensitive to the value of the rest of the job-seeker’s career, Vt.
This value inﬂuences the wage bargain because one of the consequences of delay in making
the bargain is to delay the receipt of Vt, which occurs at the moment the job-seeker makes
the bargain and begins work.
The model with completely isolated bargaining has unrealistic implications for volatil-
ity. Hall and Milgrom (2005) present a version of the model in which bargaining is less
isolated from conditions in the market because there is a hazard, ¹, that the productive














In the GE model incorporating credible threats, I pick the parameter ¹ to match the
observed volatility of unemployment approximately. The value is 1.3, corresponding to a
likelihood of 0.5 that the bargaining process would end after 2.3 weeks, should the job-
seeker and employer fail to reach a bargain. In the equilibrium of the bargaining game, the
parties make a bargain instantly, so the possibility of bargaining for a period followed by
departure of the job-seeker to another employer never occurs.
In the stochastic growth model of this paper, the bargaining bias bt might reasonably
be constant in relation to the capital stock or constant in relation to the marginal product
of labor. I split the difference by making it a Cobb-Douglas combination of the two, with
equal elasticities of 0.5. I pick the value of b so that, in the non-stochastic steady state,
the wage is the same in this model as in the base case. I also need to extend the model
by adding the short-term interest rate rt as another endogenous variable. See Hall and










Consumption growth 0.88 0.94 1.00
Investment/capital ratio 0.22 0.22 0.22
Log of capacity/capital ratio 4.43 4.59 4.83
Unemployment 1.57 1.59 1.54
Table 5. Volatilities, base model and credible-bargaining model
Table 5 shows the volatilities implied by the model with credible threats, with ¹ =
1:3. The model matches the observed values about as closely as does the base model with
sticky wages. Figures 7 and 8 show the responses of unemployment to productivity and
spending impulses when equation (35) governs wages, with ¹ = 1:3, in comparison to the
response for the earlier sticky-wage model. The credible-bargaining model responds much
less to productivity and much more to spending. The reason for the smaller response to
productivity is easy to explain—the value of ¹ implies a tighter connection between labor-
market conditions and the wage. In equation (35), the coefﬁcient on U is 1:3
0:025+1:3 = 0:990.
With respect to ﬂuctuations in productivity, the credible-bargaining model almost has the
same amount of wage ﬂexibility as the Nash-bargain model.
To explain the effect of higher exogenous spending, I examine the share of the surplus
accruing to employers:













This quantity determines employer recruiting effort. Higher interest rates reduce Zt +
Vt and thus reduce Zt ¡ Wt, reduce recruiting effort, and raise unemployment. But this
effect is offset by similar movements in Ut in the opposite direction and the coefﬁcient on

















Figure 7. Response of unemployment to productivity impulse, sticky-wage and
credible bargaining models

















Figure 8. Response of unemployment to spending impulse, sticky-wage and cred-
ible bargaining models
28Ut, as noted earlier, is close to one. The positive effect of the higher interest rate in the
denominator of the coefﬁcients multiplying bt and Ut dominates. This effect is surprisingly
powerful.
In the credible-bargaining framework, ﬂuctuations in unemployment arise primarily
from changes in exogenous spending and only secondarily from ﬂuctuations in produc-
tivity. Traditional Keynesian macroeconomics had the same perspective. Although the
credible-bargaining model has the traditional property, the mechanism is rather different.
When high exogenous product demand drives up short-term rates temporarily, job-seekers
are at a disadvantage compared to normal times because extending bargaining is more
costly. The wage bargain shifts in favor of employers, who respond by recruiting more
aggressively and lowering the unemployment rate.
7 Fluctuations in Matching Efﬁciency
In the standard model, an exogenous decline in matching efﬁciency, modeled as a lower
value of the parameter ! in equation (31), triggers a response in the labor market that
resembles a recession. Absent an explanation for such a decline in matching efﬁciency,
however, this account of a recession has little interest. Hall (2005a) describes a model
that generates ﬂuctuations of this kind, based on changes in the extent of self-selection
among job applicants. When self-selection is high, matching efﬁciency is also high because
employers enjoy a high yield from evaluating applicants.
In the model, a job-seeker has private information about her probability of qualifying
for a particular job opening. A job-seeker sets a cutoff probability p¤ and incurs an appli-
cation cost kW to apply for a job where the perceived probability of acceptance meets the
cutoff. The employer incurs an evaluation cost kE and evaluates all applicants as long as
the expected payoff from a hire covers that cost. The parties split the surplus equally—the
model embodies the standard Nash bargain based on non-credible threats to disclaim the
potential relationship.
29The expected probability that an applicant is qualiﬁed—given that applicants use their
private information and do not apply unless they know the probability to be at least p¤—is


















Changes in the distribution of the information available to job-seekers and changes in the
costs kW and kE cause shifts in the cutoff probability p¤. The ratio of the costs is unlikely
to be an important driving force. But movements in p¤ resulting from changes in infor-
mation may be a potent driving force. When job-seekers become better informed, p¤ rises
dramatically.
Fluctuations arising from self-selection operate as follows: An event occurs, such as a
reallocation of labor from a shrinking sector to growing sectors. In consequence, the typical
job-seeker is less well informed about about the likelihood of qualifying for a given job
opening. Job-seekers lower their cutoff probabilities. Employers perceive a lowering in the
fraction of applicants who are qualiﬁed and reduce their recruiting efforts correspondingly.
Job-seekers respond by further decreasing their application cutoffs. The positive feedback
is less than complete and the labor market reaches a new equilibrium because the surplus
rises as the market slackens—job-seekers’ opportunity costs U ¡ V are lower with higher
unemployment and the surplus is thus higher.
The stochastic GE framework of this paper cannot embed the full self-selection model.
Instead, I treat changes in the cutoff probability as generating changes in the matching-
efﬁciency parameter !. I double the number of discrete states indexed by g to include two






Consumption growth 0.88 0.94 0.98
Investment/capital ratio 0.22 0.22 0.23
Log of capacity/capital ratio 4.43 4.59 4.87
Unemployment 1.57 1.59 1.63
Table 6. Volatilities with variation in matching efﬁciency
independentlevelsof!. Inthelow-informationstate, Isubtractaconstantfrom ! andinthe
high-information state, I add the same constant. In the results reported below, the constant
is 1.7. Thus ! moves back and forth from 7.2 to 10.6 instead of holding at its constant value
of 8.9, as in the other models in this paper. I choose the switching probability to match the
observed persistence of unemployment.
Table 6 compares the volatility of an economy with variations in matching efﬁciency to
the volatilities of the actual U.S. economy and the base version of the model from earlier
in the paper. The model with ﬂexible wages and variations in matching efﬁciency is about
as successful as the base model in matching the volatilities of the key macro variables.
8 Concluding Remarks
The equilibrium sticky-wage model, when incorporated in a complete dynamic stochastic
macro model, gives a reasonable account of the volatility of key macro variables, including
particularly the unemployment rate. A similar model with ﬂexible wages set by a Nash
bargain falls far short of matching the actual volatility of unemployment.
Not only does the model with equilibrium wage stickiness match the standard deviation
31of unemployment, but it is capable of explaining rare episodes when the unemployment
rate exceeds 8 percent. As Figure 1 shows, such episodes occur about once every 40 years.
They are the result of an unlucky succession of productivity disappointments that result in
a capacity/capital ratio that is well below its normal level. Wages fail to adjust fully, and
the economy ﬁnds itself far to the left in Figure 4, with little of the anticipated surplus from
employment accruing to employers. They put correspondingly little effort into ﬁnding new
workers, the job-ﬁnding rate is low, and unemployment is high. The situation gradually
corrects itself, as the capacity/capital ratio moves back to normal.
An alternative model of wage determination based on credible threats and sequential
offers yields wage stickiness and unemployment volatility similar to that found with the
equilibrium sticky-wage speciﬁcation. The alternative model supplies an answer to the
primary objection to the equilibrium sticky-wage model, that it describes only an indeter-
minate equilibrium. The outcome of sequential bargaining is unique.
A third model capable of explaining observed unemployment volatility adopts the stan-
dard ﬂexible-wage speciﬁcation, but invokes shifts in matching efﬁciency. These shifts
may be the result of changes in the amount of information job-seekers have about their
likelihood of qualifying for jobs. Well-informed job-seekers self-select, thereby raising the
yield from employers’ recruiting efforts and raising matching efﬁciency.
The results in this paper suggest that modern ideas about friction in the labor market can
explain the volatility of employment and unemployment. Extensions of this investigation
would look at properties of the variables beyond their standard deviations—covariances
across variables and over time. Further, a full view of labor-market volatility probably
involves a mixture of the mechanisms explored here and others as well—see Hall (2005d)
for a review of other research with this goal. Mechanisms involving nominal frictions may
also prove important in a full explanation of the movements of unemployment. Further, I
have considered only a narrow range of driving forces. Monetary and other shocks belong
in a fuller model.
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34Appendix: Computing the Solution
I express the model as functional equations in the state variables, z and g, and their fu-
ture values, z0 and g0. Thus cg(z) is consumption when the current draw of the spending
shock is g and the output/capacity ratio is z. The spending shock takes on M possible






The future value of a variable such as consumption is cg0(z0
g;a0). To avoid cluttered notation,
I will write z0 for z0






















(1 ¡ ±)qg0(z0) + (1 ¡ °)z0(1 ¡ ug0(z0))°
qg(z)
: (43)
The core functions in the model are xg(z), vg(z), Ug(z), Vg(z), and Zg(z). The condi-
tions deﬁning these functions are:
Pg (Rg;g0(z;z
0)) = 1 (44)















Zg(z) = °z(1 ¡ ug(z))
°¡1 + Pg ((1 ¡ sg0(z
0))Zg0(z
0))xg(z) (47)
35vg(z) = (Zg(z) ¡ Wg(z))sfg(z): (48)
The other equations of the model are:
Wg(z) = ·W
¤ + (1 ¡ ·)
1
2
(Ug(z) ¡ Vg(z) + Zg(z)) (49)
cg(z) =
1 ¡ ± + z (1 ¡ ug(z))
° ¡ 1¡¿
2¿ (xg(z) ¡ 1)2 ¡ vg(z) ¡ xg(z)
1 + g
(50)
qg(z) = 1 +
1 ¡ ¿
¿
(xg(z) ¡ 1) (51)





ug(z) = s(1 ¡ fg(z)): (54)
The model has 11 endogenous variables, x, U, V , Z, v,W, c, q, f, s, and u. I associate
each with an equation, starting with x and equation (44) and ending with u and equation
(54).
I represent the core functions as Tchebysheff polynomials, as Judd recommends. Let
[a;b] include the support of z and let h(z) = (2z ¡ a ¡ b)=(b ¡ a), a function that maps
[a;b] into [¡1;1]. The polynomials are
T0(h(z)) = 1 (55)
T1(h(z)) = h(z) (56)
Ti+1(h(z)) = 2h(z)Ti(h(z)) ¡ Ti¡1(h(z)) (57)






For L equally spaced values of z in the interval [a;b], with L substantially larger than N,









































































































Figure A. Solution errors
over the 5 equations, L evaluation points, and M discrete states, deﬁnes a norm of the
departures of the current values of the µ coefﬁcients from representing a solution to the
model. I ﬁnd the values of the 5MN µ coefﬁcients that minimize the norm. I substitute out
other functions such as ug(z), using the other equations of the model.
To verify the accuracy of the solution and the polynomial approximations, I calculate
the values of the 5M-vector at 301 equally spaced points in the support of z. Figure A
shows the values for the third equation, the one governing U.
To ﬁnd the distribution of z, I use 301 equally spaced bins spanning [a;b]. This creates a
discrete state variable with 301M values. I compute the complete transition matrix implied
by the model from each of the values to each of the other values. I then solve for the
stationary probabilities by matrix inversion. I compute the impulse response functions
from the same transition matrix.
37